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Cyber Cafes, India
Cyber Cafes in India now come under strict Regulations
Posted on January 6th, 2009
by naavi in All News, India News
Read 820 times.
In the past several years, there have been many instances in India where Cyber Cafes have been used either for real or false terrorist communication. Several Cyber Crimes including stealing of bank passwords and subsequent fraudulent withdrawal of money have also happened through Cyber Cafes. Cyber Cafes have also been used regularly for sending of obscene mails to harass people. In view of these, Cyber Cafes have been considered as one of the key intermediaries which need to be regulated.
In order to regulate Cyber Cafes, several States had passed regulations some under ITA 2000 and some under the State Police Act. Now, The Information Technology Amendment Act 2008 has made many significant changes in the prevailing laws of cyber space applicable in India, one of which is regarding Cyber Cafes.
ITA 2000 had not defined Cyber Cafes and one had to interpret them as “Network Service Providers” referred to under the erstwhile Section 79 which imposed on them a responsibility for “Due Diligence” failing which they would be liable for the offences committed in their network. The concept of “Due Diligence” was interpreted from the various provisions in Cyber Cafe regulations where available or under the normal responsibilities expected from network service providers.
The New Act (To be effective after notification) after amendments which we refer as ITA 2008 has however provided a specific definition for the term “Cyber Cafe” and also included them under the term “Intermediaries”. Several aspects of the act therefore become applicable to Cyber Cafes and there is a need to take a fresh look at what Cyber Cafes are expected to do for Cyber Law Compliance.
Firstly, according to Section 2(na) of ITA 2008, “Cyber cafe” means any facility from where access to the internet is offered by any person in the ordinary course of business to the members of the public. This definition is an improvement of what was earlier proposed by the Expert Committee and the first draft of ITAA 2006 which had several anomalies.
This definition may however conflict with the definitions given under the current regulations passed by various States. For example, the Karnataka regulations for Cyber Cafes define a Cyber Cafe as: “Any premises where the Cyber Cafe Owner/Network Service Provider provides the computer services including internet access to the public”.
According to TN regulations, a “Browsing Center” means and includes “any establishment by what so ever name called where the general public have an access to Internet in any of its forms, protocols either on payment or free of charges for any purpose including recreation or amusement” It also says..” a browsing center shall be deemed to be a public place as defined under Sec-3 of Tamil Nadu City Police 1888″.
In the Karnataka definition, any “Network Service Provider” providing “Computer Services” may be called the “Cyber Cafe”. In the TN definition, any Kiosks in say Airport or a Railway Station where free Internet access is given to public may also qualify as a Cyber Cafe. The TN rules require registration of Cyber Cafes and both impose responsibilities such as maintenance of visitor’s register, verification of photo ID etc.
The Karnataka regulation was notified under Section 90 of ITA 2000 while the TN act was notified under the State police act. Now that ITA 2000 has been amended, the provisions under Karnataka Cyber Cafe regulation may have to be considered as in fructuous while there may a question mark on the validity of TN regulations. Mumbai, Maharashtra and Gujarat who also have some state level regulations may also be in a state similar to that of TN.
Section 2(w) of ITA 2008 further states that the definition of “Intermediaries” includes “Cyber Cafes”. The regulations for Intermediaries therefore apply to Cyber Cafes after ITA 2008 becomes effective.
As per Section 67(C) of ITA 2008, an Intermediary is expected to preserve and retain such information as may be specified for such duration and in such manner and format as the Central Government may prescribe and on failure to do so he may be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Thus the responsibility of Cyber Cafes has now been clearly defined with a three year imprisonment which is also cognizable, bailable and compoundable.
Additionally, three important sections have been added to the present Act according to which the Government has the powers to intercept, monitor, block, and collect traffic data. These sections impose certain responsibilities on the intermediaries and make non compliance punishable. These regulations also apply to Cyber Cafes.
For example, under Section 69 (modified version), the central Government or a State Government or any of its officer specially authorized by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, direct any agency of the appropriate Government to intercept, monitor or decrypt or cause to be intercepted or monitored or decrypted any information transmitted received or stored through any computer resource. The Procedure and safeguards subject to which such interception or monitoring or decryption may be carried out, will be prescribed and if the intermediary fails to assist the agency, he may be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
The important points to be noted in this section as well as the two other sections 69A and 69 B are
a) These powers are available to both the Central and State Governments who can specially authorize an officer for the purpose.
b) It can be invoked even for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence. It is debatable whether the term “Cognizable offence” has to be restricted to ITA 2008 only or can be extended to IPC or other laws as well.
c) Government shall prescribe necessary safeguards to be followed by Intermediaries.
d) The powers include demanding of information stored in a computer e) Non compliance may result in stiff penalty of imprisonment upto 7 years.
Under Section 69 A, the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorized by it in this behalf may direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block access by the public. The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine. This section provides for blocking of websites in any case where prevention of a cognizable offence. This can take care of blocking of websites which may host pornographic content which is an offence under sections 67, 67A and 67 B of ITA 2008.
Under Section 69 B, the Government now will have powers to collect “Traffic data” and also seek online access to information in the hands of an intermediary. The Intermediary who intentionally or knowingly contravenes the provisions may be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Under this section, Government can force Cyber Cafes to follow safeguards specified and also demand online access if required.
The sections 69, 69A and 69B specifically vest the powers in an agency to be designated. It has deliberately avoided the use of the term “Police”. The legislative intent is therefore indicative that Police need not be the agency to exercise the powers under these sections.
There is of course a serious concern in the public that the powers under these sections may be misused. Naavi.org has been suggesting that we need to set up an agency called “Netizen’s Rights Commission” on the lines of the Human Rights Commission which can have the powers to receive the complaints, investigate and recommend prosecution of abuse of the powers under the sections 69,69A and 69B.
In the event any State Government would like to assume powers under these sections and also provide the benefits of the powers to the Police, it would be advisable for the State Government to set up a “State Netizen’s Rights Commission” and subject the Police to the scrutiny of the commission or set up a separate non-police agency such as a “State Cyber Security Authority” and then vest the powers in such an authority.
In the meantime, if the Central Government also notifies an agency for the purpose of exercising the authority under Sections 69, 69A and 69B and provides it with pan national jurisdiction, then there may be a conflict of jurisdiction such as what we today have between the State Police and the CBI.
There is an expectation that the Indian Computer Emergency Team referred to under Section 70 B of ITA2008 may itself be designated as the agency of the Central Government with a national jurisdiction and CERT-In the present division of MCIT may itself be stepping into the shoes of the Indian Computer Emergency Team.
Considering that there are thousands of Cyber Cafes all over India, in the event a Central agency takes up the responsibility for monitoring Cyber Cafes, there may be a need for an “All India Cyber Cafe Monitoring Authority” exclusively to meet the requirements of Cyber Cafe regulations. [More details on the amendments is available at http://www.naavi.org/)
Naavi
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FAQs
Private factory guard
A security guard, (or security officer) is usually a privately and formally employed person who is paid to protect property, assets, or people.
Often, security officers are uniformed and act to protect property by maintaining a high visibility presence to deter illegal and inappropriate actions, observing (either directly, through patrols, or by watching alarm systems or video cameras) for signs of crime, fire or disorder; then taking action and reporting any incidents to their client and emergency services as appropriate.
Since at least the Middle Ages in Europe, the term watchman was more commonly applied to this function. This term was carried over to North America where it was interchangeable with night-watchman until both terms were replaced with the modern security-based titles.
Contents[hide]
1 Functions and duties
2 Personnel
2.1 Types of security personnel and companies
3 Licensing and regulation
3.1 United States
3.2 Europe
3.3 Canada
3.4 Malaysia
3.5 Hong Kong
3.5.1 Legislation
3.5.2 Qualify
3.5.3 Permit
3.5.4 Power of Arrest
3.5.5 Miscellaneous
4 Security officers and the police
5 Criticisms
6 Trends
7 History
8 Notable security guards
9 Unionization
10 See also
11 References
12 External links
//
[edit] Functions and duties
Many security firms and proprietary security departments practice the "detect, deter, observe and report" methodology. Security officers are not required to make arrests (but have the authority to make a citizen's arrest) or otherwise act as an agent of law enforcement at the request of a police officer, sheriff, and others.
In addition to the methodology mentioned above, a private security officer's primary duty is the prevention and deterrence of crime. Security personnel enforce company rules and can act to protect lives and property. In fact, they frequently have a contractual obligation to provide these actions. Security officers are often trained to perform arrest and control procedures (including handcuffing and restraints), operate emergency equipment, perform first aid, CPR, take accurate notes, write detailed reports, and perform other tasks as required by the contractee they are serving.
Many security officers are required to go through additional training mandated by the state for the carrying of weapons such as batons, firearms, and pepper spray (e.g. the Bureau of Security and Investigative Services[1] in California has requirements that a license for each item listed must be carried while on duty). [1] Some officers are required to complete police certification for special duties.
Positions are also set to grow in the U.S., with 350,000 new security jobs expected over the next decade.[2] In recent years, due to elevated threats of terrorism, most security officers are required to have bomb-threat training and/or emergency crisis training, especially those located in soft target areas such as shopping malls, schools, and any other area where the general public congregate.
One major economic justification for security personnel is that insurance companies (particularly fire insurance carriers) will give substantial rate discounts to sites which have a 24-hour presence; for a high risk or high value venue, the discount can often exceed the money being spent on its security program.
This is because having security on site increases the odds that any fire will be noticed and reported to the local fire department before a total loss occurs. Also, the presence of security personnel (particularly in combination with effective security procedures) tends to diminish "shrinkage," theft, employee misconduct and safety rule violations, property damage, or even sabotage. Many casinos hire security guards to protect money when transferring it from the casino to the casino's bank.
Security personnel may also perform access control at building entrances and vehicle gates; meaning, they ensure that employees and visitors display proper passes or identification before entering the facility. Security officers are often called upon to respond to minor emergencies (lost persons, lockouts, dead vehicle batteries, etc.) and to assist in serious emergencies by guiding emergency responders to the scene of the incident, helping to redirect foot traffic to safe locations, and by documenting what happened on an incident report.
Armed security officers are frequently contracted to respond as law enforcement until a given situation at a client location is under control and/or public authorities arrive on the scene.
Patrolling is usually a large part of a security officer's duties. Often these patrols are logged by use of a guard tour patrol system, which require regular patrols. The most commonly used form used to be mechanical clock systems that required a key for manual punching of a number to a strip of paper inside with the time pre-printed on it.
Recently, electronic systems have risen in popularity due to their light weight, ease of use, and downloadable logging capabilities [3]. Regular patrols are, however, becoming less accepted as an industry standard, as it provides predictability for the would-be criminal, as well as monotony for the security officer on duty.
Random patrols are easily programmed into these systems, allowing greater freedom of movement and unpredictability. Global positioning systems are also easing their way into the market as a more effective means of tracking officer movement and patrol behavior.
[edit] Personnel
Sunday, February 15, 2009
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
No security, No claim money
Posted On Wednesday, February 04, 2009 at 05:08:53 PM
Burglary insurance claim rejected for security lapse
Mayank Soni -SV Road
If you do not take adequate security measures for the safety of your shop, the insurance firm will not be liable to honour the burglary claim.
Recently, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissed VR Jewellers’ complaint against The Oriental Insurance Company Limited, as he had not taken proper precautions to prevent burglary, violating the insurance policy rules.
Partners of the showroom had taken an insurance policy against burglary for their shop from Oriental Insurance valid from January 30, 1996 to January 29, 1997. In October 1996, unidentified thieves entered the shop, breaking open the iron grill window and escaped with jewellery worth Rs 13 lakhs.
On inspection, the insurance company’s surveyor found the thieves stole the jewellery from the cupboard with original keys, which the owners kept in the cash counter. Further, the surveyor pointed out that the window was such that anyone could enter the shop easily, making the shop susceptible to thefts at night.
AS Vidyarthi, defence advocate argued that the insurance proposal form clearly mentions that ornaments should be stored in a standard safe, otherwise the policy cover would not operate. At the time of burglary, owners had kept the ornaments in a locally-made almirah that was not theft-resistant.
Judicial Member of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission observed PN Kashalkar, “If ornaments worth about Rs 14 lakhs were kept in the shop, it was the duty of the complainant to engage services of watchman at least at night. A common watchman on the road available for the locality would not be sufficient as good security measures on the part of the complainant.”
However, partner Manilal Bheda’s contention was that they had shown the cupboard to the company’s representative before the policy was issued, and they had not taken any objections. He says, “What is the use of taking a policy if we do not get a claim? I will have to consult my lawyer about going in appeal.”
mayank.soni@timesgroup.com
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Schneier on Security
A blog covering security and security technology.
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December 1, 2008
Lessons from Mumbai
I'm still reading about the Mumbai terrorist attacks, and I expect it'll be a long time before we get a lot of the details. What we know is horrific, and my sympathy goes out to the survivors of the dead (and the injured, who often seem to get ignored as people focus on death tolls). Without discounting the awfulness of the events, I have some initial observations:
- Low-tech is very effective. Movie-plot threats -- terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists with biological agents, terrorists targeting our water supplies -- might be what people worry about, but a bunch of trained (we don't really know yet what sort of training they had, but it's clear that they had some) men with guns and grenades is all they needed.
- At the same time, the attacks were surprisingly ineffective. I can't find exact numbers, but it seems there were about 18 terrorists. The latest toll is 195 dead, 235 wounded. That's 11 dead, 13 wounded, per terrorist. As horrible as the reality is, that's much less than you might have thought if you imagined the movie in your head. Reality is differentfrom the movies.
- Even so, terrorism is rare. If a bunch of men with guns and grenades is all they really need, then why isn't this sort of terrorism more common? Why not in the U.S., where it's easy to get hold of weapons? It's because terrorism is very, very rare.
- Specific countermeasures don't help against these attacks. None of the high-priced countermeasures that defend against specific tactics and specific targets made, or would have made, any difference: photo ID checks, confiscating liquids at airports, fingerprinting foreigners at the border, bag screening on public transportation, anything. Even metal detectors and threat warnings didn't do any good:
"If I look at what we had, which all of us complained about, it could not have stopped what took place," he told CNN. "It's ironic that we did have such a warning, and we did have some measures."
He said people were told to park away from the entrance and had to go through a metal detector. But he said the attackers came through a back entrance.
"They knew what they were doing, and they did not go through the front. All of our arrangements are in the front," he said.
If there's any lesson in these attacks, it's not to focus too much on the specifics of the attacks. Of course, that's not the way we're programmed to think. We respond to stories, not analysis. I don't mean to be unsympathetic; this tendency is human and these deaths are really tragic. But 18 armed people intent on killing lots of innocents will be able to do just that, and last-line-of-defense countermeasures won't be able to stop them. Intelligence, investigation, and emergency response. We have to find and stop the terrorists before they attack, and deal with the aftermath of the attacks we don't stop. There really is no other way, and I hope that we don't let the tragedy lead us into unwise decisions about how to deal with terrorism.
EDITED TO ADD (12/13): Two interesting essays.
Posted on December 1, 2008 at 8:03 AM • 148 Comments • View Blog Reactions
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'Super cop' is no solution to terrorist threat
INDIA:
The Mumbai terrorist attack was one more occasion for the Indian politicians to call for calm, peace and national unity. Political parties like the Communist Party of India (Marxist) convened a special Politburo session and repeated the rhetoric, in addition to demanding that the Government of India approach the UN Security Council. The Hindu fundamentalists like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) made use of the incident to stir up further anti-Pakistan, essentially anti-Muslim, sentiments.
The Union Home Minister Mr. Shivraj V Patil resigned. The Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh convened urgent meetings with high-ranking officers, ministers and defence chiefs. The meeting decided to speed-up the formation of a Federal Investigation Agency and to set up four new centres of the National Security Guards (NSG) in the country.
The final word was that of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, the president of the Indian National Congress. Mrs. Gandhi gave the ultimatum that her party will tolerate no more terrorism and called upon the Indians to eradicate it from the country. The question is whether the Government of India has any responsibility to prevent such incidents, or whether the people has to embark upon justice delivery themselves?
Among many other things, the Mumbai terrorist attack serves as the latest reminder of the condition of the law and order apparatus in the country, and of the police in particular. As stated after many other former incidents of similar nature, India's foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), claimed that it had passed over information to the Maharashtra State Police well in advance that a terrorist attack on the city was very likely. The RAW further put the blame upon the local police for its lack of preparedness.
The fact remains that the Maharashtra State Police, like any other state police force in the country, can hardly do anything to avert these incidents. The state of policing in the country is in such demise that it has completely severed its contact with the people. Most police officers contact the members of the public only to demand bribes. Corruption in the police service is at such levels that even in order to lodge a complaint the complainant has to pay a bribe.
Police brutality is so rampant in the country that the sight of a police uniform is enough to scare an ordinary person, particularly among the poor population. Information, independent of its nature, has to be forced out of the ordinary people. Information obtained under the threat of violence is tainted and cannot be acted upon. Terrorists are different from the ordinary people in the sense that they have money, better training and equipment at their disposal to achieve their goals. They can bribe the police and are in fact doing so.
A month ago, some suspects taken into custody from the state of Kerala on the accusation that they were recruiting youngsters from the northern districts of the state for terrorist activities in north India and abroad, claimed that so far their operation went without any hindrance because they were able to bribe some police officers in the state. In fact many officers in the Kerala state police had no clue that terrorist recruitment cells were in full swing in the state until the identity cards of some terrorists who were recently killed in the state of Kashmir were recovered from their personal belongings. The identity documents were issued in Kerala pinpointing their residential address in the state.
To expect an ordinary Indian to approach the local police with information is an impossibility in the country. An example is the statements made by the parents who lost their children in the infamous 2006 December Noida serial murder case. The case began after the recovery of the skeletal remains of missing children in Nithari village in the outskirts of Noida city close to New Delhi.
The investigation of the case relieved that when the parents approached the Noida police to lodge complaints about their missing children, the police refused to register their complaints. When the parents persisted, they were chased away by the police with the threat that if they returned false cases would be registered against them accusing them of selling their children. The parents went away from the police station, since they were poor and could not afford to pay bribes to the police to get their complaints registered. An administration that expects the ordinary public to freely approach the local police with information is consciously ignoring the reality.
The public mistrust in the local police is not the result of an overnight incident. It is the crystallization of years of experience. Without drastic changes in policing, this mistrust will not only continue, but will increase. Every incident of police failure brought to the people's attention will further isolate the police from the people. A law enforcement agency which lacks the trust of the people cannot maintain law and order. An officer who serves in such a police force essentially suffers from demoralisation.
No government, state or central, that has governed the country has ever tried to address the deep-rooted problems of policing, and thereby the law and order in India. Politicians across the board use the police for their short-term political interests. The police reciprocate their affinity to the people in power by letting them to be exploited.
Today in India, the police serve the rich and the powerful. The police is a demoralised state agency that lacks the hope of improving their own condition. A police force that cannot investigate a petty crime efficiently cannot prevent terrorism, it can only promote it.
The Mumbai incident like many other former incidents will soon be forgotten. Those who will remember it are those who lost their loved ones. But unfortunately they do not have the political or financial clout to influence the policy makers in India.
The windfall of the Mumbai incident for the Government of India is evident. The Federal Investigation Agency will soon be formed. They will also assume the role of a 'super cop'. The super cop and the Agency he represent will be an additional reason for the ordinary policeman for further demoralisation. India does not need a super cop. It rather requires a normal and people-friendly police force.
Otherwise people will increasingly start taking things in their own hands. One need not look very far to see examples of this. The day before yesterday, in Khatoli town of Muzzaffarnagar district of Uttar Pradesh state, a person was lynched by the public for suspected theft. In 2008 there were more than a dozen cases of public lynchings reported in India. Hence, people have started taking things in their own hands long before Mrs. Sonia Gandhi's request. There is no doubt that the Indians are united – in their distrust of the police and the politicians.
The national media and the civil society groups in the country have a greater responsibility in this juncture. If the media and the civil society groups in the country try to reflect more of the people's voice than vested interests, there is an increased possibility for these institutions to in fact persuade policy makers and politicians to meet the people's demand. The relatively lesser degree of impartiality and openness of the media and the civil society in India are the two serious impediments that prevent these institutions from reaching out to the people. On this front they somewhat equate themselves with the Indian police.
The Government of India is likely to initiate farcical policies on the pretext of countering terrorism in the country without addressing the deep-rooted problems in policing. The continuation of these policies also means the failure of the media and the civil society organisations in the country. It will be a n unfortunate reflection of their lack of understanding of the realities at the grass roots.
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About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.
Posted on 2008-12-02
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